The Politics of Exit: Emigration, Collective Action, and Agrarian Reform in Mexico (Under Review)

Do exit options like emigration reduce pressure on governments, elites, or institutions to undertake difficult political reforms from within? If so, what are the broader consequences for those with and without access to exit options themselves? This manuscript examines how the possibility of exit influences individuals’ willingness and ability to participate in collective action and how this in turn shapes the prospects for political change from within. I argue that the presence of exit options complicates collective action through two mechanisms. First, those who can leave become less willing to invest in uncertain efforts to improve conditions directly through collective action. Second, simply knowing that some people have access to exit options lowers everyone’s confidence that collective action can be successful. Through this expectations channel, even those without access to exit options become more hesitant to participate in collective efforts to effect change from within, and those who do have access to exit options feel more compelled to pursue them.

The primary empirical application is labor migration and rural politics in Mexico between 1910 and 2010. For over a century, Mexico has seen periodic phases of high emigration to the United States, but the availability of these exit options has varied greatly across space and time for reasons plausibly unrelated to domestic politics. Using detailed subnational data and a series of related research designs, I show that collective political mobilization and government responsiveness declined when and where emigration became more attractive or available. Drawing on evidence from this and other cases (including El Salvador, Japan, and the former German Democratic Republic), I trace the mechanisms through which ongoing emigration complicated collective action both contemporaneously and over a longer time horizon, illustrating how the possibility of exit made it difficult to sustain pressure for reform, why people increasingly felt compelled to pursue “voluntary” exit options in place of trying to effect change from within, and how governments and elites have used the promise of exit to undermine the threat of opposition or unrest. This work provides a new framework for considering whether exit options are always empowering to those who possess them, how individual exit options influence others, and what precisely is meant by the popular representation of emigration as a “safety valve” for political conflict.

See Table of Contents and Introduction. Other chapters available upon request.

The Tightrope of Centralization (with Francisco Garfias)

This book examines the dynamic relationship between political centralization and domestic conflict. Central authorities in many contexts rely on local elites to maintain order and repress rebellion, but this often comes at a high cost in terms of lost revenue and control. State-building efforts that consolidate authority in the central government are often attractive to central rulers, especially when facing external threat, but they are risky as well. Though they may succeed in bolstering the financial strength of the state, these efforts run the risk of backfiring by alienating crucial intermediaries who maintain order in the periphery. We explore this argument empirically drawing on qualitative evidence from Russia, France, and China and detailed subnational data on state building and conflict across over 500 years of Mexican history.

Manuscript in Preparation. Book Conference Scheduled for Fall 2024. Please email for more information.